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Abstract 
 
This article proposes developing the public bioethics aspect of  stewardship and applying it to the 
European Union (EU) as “supra-stewardship”, a tool for opening a discursive space for citizen 
participation in EU pandemic preparedness planning. With this in mind, the article highlights some of 
the contours for engagement on the boundaries of  responsibility and production of  governance distortions 
and failures brought out by attention to framing , distribution, vulnerability and learning. This should 
help  citizens  to  tackle  the  complementary  expert  and  public  rationalities  that  undermine  their 
involvement, contribute supplementary knowledge towards governance, and help promote institutional 
learning by the EU and resilience. 
Key words: pandemic inf luenza; preparedness; security; participation; 
supra-stewardship 
 
Introduction 
 
he EU has an increasingly prominent role in public health issues,1 as highlighted by its 
pandemic preparedness planning, such as for the recent influenza strain H1N1 or 
“swine flu”.2 This planning aims to ensure the EU is of  “added value” in the face of 
“emergency”3  by respecting member state (MS) responsibility for the “management of 
health services and medical care and the allocation of the resources assigned to them”.4 It does 
so by ensuring the interoperability of  proliferating MS plans and, as an instance of 
reflexive governance or the “government of  governments”,5  the readiness of  “essential 
 
* Lecturer in Law, School of Law, Queen’s University Belfast (m.flear@qub.ac.uk). The support of the British 
Academy (SG-48186 EU Governance of  AIDS, Cancer and  Obesity: Governmentality, Citizenship 
and Polity), the ESRC (PI: RES-451-26-0764 European Law and New Health Technologies) and UACES 
(PI: A Symposium with  Professor Roger Brownsword: Super-stewardship in the Context of  Public 
Health)  are acknowledged with gratitude. Thanks to Roger Brownsword, Tammy Hervey, Jean McHale, 
John Morison, Thérèse Murphy, Dieter Pesendorfer, Sara Ramshaw,  Anastasia Vakulenko, Sally 
Wheeler and the peer reviewer. The usual disclaimer applies. 
1 For an overview, see T K Hervey and J V McHale, Health Law and the European Union (Cambridge: CUP 2004). 
2 For  instance,   www.bbc.co.uk/health/physical_health/conditions/swineflumulti1.shtml  (last  accessed 
5 September 2011). 
3 As required by the principle of subsidiarity in Article 5(1) and (3) amended Treaty on European Union (TEU). 
4 Article 168(7) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (emphasis added). 
5 Coining Dean’s “government of government”: M Dean, Governmentality 2nd edn (London: Sage 2010), p. 226. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2008934
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infrastructures”. These comprise: planning and coordination; monitoring and assessment; 
prevention and containment; health system response; and communication. EU 
preparedness  distributes  responsibilities6   around  the  EU’s  multi-level  system   of 
governance to a range of actors, including: the European Commission (the Commission); 
the European Centre for Disease Control (ECDC); MS authorities; private actors such as 
manufacturers of vaccines; the news media; and the EU’s citizenry.7 While the “imperative 
of  preparedness is not new”,8 EU preparedness (hereafter simply  preparedness) is still 
quite a recent and underexplored phenomenon.9 
Working within science and technology studies’ (STS) view that “the technical is political”, 
Jasanoff terms risk assessment and management techniques like preparedness “technologies 
of hubris” since they make problems like pandemics visible in an effort to manage them and 
keep the economy working.10  Making a point that resonates with the  governmentality 
perspective used in this article and introduced in section 2 below, Jasanoff stresses how these 
technologies operate to depoliticise and naturalise governance, and as  such help to quiet 
contestation and dissent, and ultimately legitimate that governance. Yet, they also engender 
“perils of  prediction”, especially in contexts of  high uncertainty,  such as masking the 
normative in the technical, and the production of governance distortions and failures. 
Jasanoff  asserts that identifying, managing and potentially correcting such “perils” 
requires a “civic epistemology” that gathers supplementary knowledge from throughout 
society.11 This is to be achieved through a “technology of humility”: citizen participation 
around the focal points of  framing, vulnerability, distribution and learning to query the 
purpose of risk governance, whom it hurts, whom it benefits, and how we might know.12 
Given this, how might citizen participation around the focal points be facilitated to resist 
depoliticisation and naturalisation of governance, to raise awareness and promote 
discussion around the boundaries of responsibility as well as the production of governance 
distortions and failures, and generate knowledge for decision-making? How might law – 
specifically human rights13 – assist in facilitating this task and with what tools? 
While recognising that citizen participation requires a range of  formal and informal 
mechanisms, processes and fora, I focus on constructing a biopolitical14 discursive space in 
which citizens can use the focal points to demand and contest decision-making. I develop and 
seek to facilitate human rights’ recent interest in citizen participation – also a hot topic in the 
 
 
 
6 S J Collier and A Lakoff, “Distributed preparedness: space, security and citizenship  in the United 
States” (2008) 26(1) Environment and Planning, D: Society and Space 7. 
7 Article 9 TEU and Article 20 TFEU. 
8 F Lentzos and N Rose, “Governing insecurity: contingency planning, protection,  resilience” (2009) 38(2) 
Economy and Society 230, pp. 235–6. 
9 Cf. S Mounier-Jack and R Coker, “Pandemic influenza: are Europe’s institutions  prepared?” (2006) 
16(2) European Journal of  Public Health 119; S L Greer, “The European Centre for Disease Prevention and 
Control: hub or hollow core?” and H Elliott, S L Greer and D K Jones, “Mapping disease control in the 
European Union”, (2011) Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law (forthcoming). 
10   S Jasanoff, “Technologies of  humility: citizen participation in governing science”  (2003) 41 Minerva 
223, p. 238. 
11   Ibid; S Jasanoff, Designs on Nature (Woodstock: Princeton UP 2005), p. 250. 
12   Jasanoff, “Technologies of humility”, n. 10 above. 
13   After the “human rights revolution” law tends to be thought of “as a system of rights which frames and contains 
government power”: N Walker, “Review of  M Loughlin,  Sword and Scales: An examination of  the 
relationship between law and politics” (2001) Public Law 644, p. 646 (emphasis added). 
14   Jasanoff, Designs on Nature, n. 11 above, p. 36. See also: M Dillon and L  Lobo-Guerrero, “Biopolitics 
of security in the 21st century” (2008) 34(2) Review of  International Studies 265. 
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EU15  – as being about empowerment.16  Attention to empowerment resonates with  the 
nuance in STS that “the technical is potentially political”,17 in that it helps attune framing, 
vulnerability, distribution and learning towards the identification of  disempowerment and 
potentially unjust power relations – that is, when citizen  participation makes sense and 
preparedness should be political.18 
This is part of a broader attempt by human rights to develop something other than a 
zero-sum relationship with discourses of risk, safety and security,19 and maintain a 
connection with the targets of governance especially in fast-moving contexts typified by 
high uncertainty. Human rights must also demonstrate efficacy in the face of competition 
for regulatory relevance – and different figurations of citizen participation – from the other 
points of the “bioethical triangle” shaping governance: a largely restrictive and 
disempowering dignitarian perspective20 and a pragmatic utilitarian perspective. Even as 
failure might create a “toxic” backlash against human rights as it seeks to shape risk 
governance, encouraging public interest has been highlighted as the main benefit of such 
an approach.21 At the same time, citizen participation around the focal points is intended 
to recognise the possibility of ambiguity or unforeseen consequences, supplement dominant 
technologies of hubris, and as such might make governance and human rights more resilient 
in the event of failure. 
Bearing in mind Moore’s observation that “public bioethics has so far remained largely 
separate from the analysis of public participation in scientific governance”,22 in the next 
section I nominate and seek to instrumentalise the public bioethics aspect of stewardship, 
a model for population-level bioethics that is linked to and inflected by human rights. As I 
explain, this link to human rights makes stewardship adept at being honed into supra- 
stewardship by and for citizens: a tool to open a discursive space around, and their 
participation in, preparedness. 
In section 3, I suggest how supra-stewardship could be used to make an initial attempt 
at bringing out the normative in the technical by exploring the construction of 
preparedness through discourses of risk, security, public understanding of science (PUS), 
and which are undergirded by neoliberalism. I recommend only some of the contours for 
engagement on the boundaries of  responsibility and governance distortions and failures 
brought out by attention to framing, distribution and vulnerability. Further, I highlight the 
denial of citizens’ potential to connect with and make a substantive contribution towards 
 
 
15   Making  it  a  site  of  great  hope  for  the  democratisation  of  the  global  governance  of  life:  S  
Jasanoff, “Biotechnology and empire: the global power of  seeds and science” (2006) 21 OSIRIS 273. 
16   M Flear and A Vakulenko, “A human rights perspective on citizen participation in the EU’s governance of 
new technologies” (2010) (10)4 Human Rights Law Review 661. 
17   A Moore, “Beyond participation: opening up political theory in STS” (2010) 40(5) Social Studies of Science 793, 
p. 797 (emphasis added). This is a review of: M B  Brown, Science in Democracy: Expertise, institutions 
and representation (Cambridge MA: MIT Press 2009). 
18   Brown, Science in Democracy, ibid. Also see: A E Yamin, “Suffering and  powerlessness: the significance 
of promoting participation in rights-based approaches to health” (2009) 11 Health and Human Rights 5. 
19   Such as “rights as risk” and “risk within rights” in: T Murphy and N Whitty, “Is human rights prepared? Risk, 
rights and public health emergencies” (2009) 17 Medical Law Review 219. 
20   For  example,  see:  R  Brownsword,  “Human  dignity,  ethical  pluralism,  and  the  regulation  of  modern 
biotechnologies” in T Murphy (ed.), New Technologies and Human Rights (Oxford: OUP 2009). 
21   T Murphy, “Technology, tools and toxic expectations: post-publication notes on New Technologies and Human 
Rights” (2009) 2 Law, Innovation and Technology 181. 
22   A  Moore,  “Public  bioethics  and  public  engagement:  the  politics  of  ‘proper  talk’”  (2010)  19(2)  Public 
Understanding of Science 197, at p. 197. Also: A Moore, “Public bioethics and deliberative democracy” (2010) 58 
Political Studies 715. 
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governance through their construction within a disempowering “deficit model” as being in 
need of education through their participation.23 This “peril of prediction” complements 
the hubristic expert rationality in preparedness. In the final section, I explain that supra- 
stewardship might help citizens to resist the deficit model, especially by allowing them to 
contribute knowledge towards decision-making, and promote institutional learning by the 
EU as well as resilience. 
 
Supra-stewardship 
 
In sketching supra-stewardship I overview and highlight some key and useful features of 
stewardship models in the context of  public health. I do not examine their respective 
advantages and disadvantages.24 I use a critical theory and especially Foucault-influenced 
way of thinking about supra-stewardship, citizen participation and governance. Put simply, 
I am interested in these as discourses because they literally produce power – and provide a 
way to shape it.25 In the context of disease, epidemiology and risk have historically laid the 
basis for governance. Their focus on population as the “end and instrument of 
government”, make it “possible to think, reflect, and calculate . . . outside the juridical 
framework of sovereignty”,26 and give rise to governmentality. 
In this setting freedom is “one of the facets . . .of the deployment of apparatuses of 
security”.27 Security is about responding “to a reality in such a way that . . .[it] cancels out 
the reality to which it responds . . . regulates it”.28 In late modernity there is resort to 
neoliberal rationality29 through the use of market techniques and practices of “governing 
at a distance” in order to induce self-management and optimisation of health and welfare.30 
Extending this are moves towards reflexive governance. Dean explains that these work by 
“securing the mechanisms of government. Society itself can be changed, according to this 
view  .  .  .  through  transformation  of   the  mechanisms  by  which  it  had  previously  been 
governed”.31 Moreover, the accountability and legitimacy of governmentality becomes ever 
more important as formally accountable sites of power tighten their relations with science 
and technology,32 and citizens engage with this reflexively as a “knowledge society”.33 
 
 
 
23   Flear and Vakulenko, “A human rights perspective”, n. 16 above. 
24   Cf. the other articles in this special issue. This article uses the approach and borrows elements developed 
elsewhere: Flear and Vakulenko, “A human rights perspective”, n. 16 above. 
25   M Foucault, The History of  Sexuality, vol. I: The will to knowledge (London: Penguin 1998), p. 101. 
26   M Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977–1978  (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan 2007), pp. 104–5. 
27   Ibid. p. 49. 
28   Ibid. p. 47. 
29   Rose et al. describe “rationality” as “a way of doing things that . . . [is] oriented to specific objectives and that 
. . . [reflects] on itself in characteristic ways”: N Rose, P O’Malley and M Valverde, “Governmentality” (2006) 
2 Annual Review of  Law Society and Science 83, p. 84. 
30   M Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978–1979 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 
2008). Cf. T Lemke, “‘The birth of biopolitics’:  Michel Foucault’s lecture at the Collège de France on neo- 
liberal governmentality” (2001) 30(2) Economy and Society 190; W Brown, Edgework (Woodstock: Princeton UP 
2005), pp. 39–44. 
31   Dean, Governmentality, n. 5 above, p. 226 (emphasis added). 
32   W Brown, Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the age of identity and empire (Princeton NJ: Princeton UP 2006), p. 15; 
Jasanoff, Designs on Nature, n. 11 above, pp. 5–6. 
33   D Bell, The Coming of  Post-Industrial Society: A venture in social forecasting (Harmondsworth: Basic Books 1976); 
M Castells, The Rise of  the Network Society (=The Information Age, vol. I) (Oxford: Blackwell 1996); K Knorr 
Cetina, Epistemic Cultures. How the sciences make knowledge (Cambridge MA: Harvard UP 1999); N Stehr, Knowledge 
Societies (London: Sage 1994). 
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In  light  of   this,  supra-stewardship  can  be  sketched  out.  In  the  World  Health 
Organisation’s (WHO) version, stewardship is linked and even conflated with governance.34 
The World Health Report 2000 explains how stewardship essentially involves “setting and 
enforcing the rules of the game and providing strategic direction for all the different actors 
involved”.35 It is “the very essence of good government”, with state governments having 
the “[u]ltimate”36 responsibility. 
More recently, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics in its report Public Health: Ethical 
issues37  (Nuffield) sought to develop a human rights-based approach to incorporate a 
precautionary way of  thinking into population-level bioethics for public health contexts. 
Three of  Nuffield’s authors, Baldwin, Brownsword and Schmidt, note how stewardship 
means that “liberal states have responsibilities to look after important needs of people both 
individually and collectively. Therefore, states are stewards both to individual people . . . and to 
the  population  as  a  whole”.38   Developing  stewardship  beyond  the  state  into   “super- 
stewardship” is noted by Brownsword as “a significant item of unfinished business”.39 
Part of that task is developing the public bioethics aspect of stewardship as a tool for 
citizen participation. As Ashcroft explains, public bioethics is “a set of  practices for 
legitimating the ‘social license to practise’”40 of medicine and the broader governance of 
life. Recognising the de-legitimating crises and failures of late modernity’s technologies of 
hubris – such as bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) and genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs) – and in an attempt to tackle normative concerns, there has been a 
widespread turn towards bioethics – including within the EU – that arguably displaces the 
centrality of those scientific and technical models.41 As such, instrumentalising and 
widening the rhetorical opening provided by public bioethics is a useful resource for a 
human rights-oriented and inspired perspective interested in empowering citizens. 
I use the term supra-stewardship to emphasise the EU’s sui generis or supra-national nature 
and focus on the public bioethics aspect of  its stewardship responsibilities towards its 
citizens.42  In adopting a human rights-oriented approach, I suggest only some of  the 
contours for empowerment of citizens as they bring out the normative in technical through 
engagement around the boundaries of  responsibility and the production of  governance 
distortions and failures. This engagement is facilitated by attention to framing, distribution, 
vulnerability and learning. I stop short of establishing criteria for assessing preparedness or 
prescribing the precise features of  supra-stewardship. In an empowering way, it is for 
 
 
34   “Stewardship    and    governance”:    www.euro.who.int/en/what-we-do/health-topics/Health-systems/ 
stewardship-and-governance (last accessed 5 September 2011). 
35   “Message from the Director General, Gro Harlem Brundtland” in WHO, World Health Report 2000 (Geneva: 
WHO 2000), p. viii. 
36   Ibid. Also see: WHO, World Health Day: International health security: invest in health, build a safer future (Geneva: 
WHO 2007). 
37   Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Public Health: Ethical issues (London: Nuffield Council on Bioethics 2007). 
38   T Baldwin, R Brownsword and H Schmidt, “Stewardship, paternalism and public health: further thoughts” 
2(1) Public Health Ethics (2009) 113, p. 115 (emphasis added). Citing Nuffield Council, Public Health, n. 37 above, 
p. 25. 
39   R Brownsword, “So what does the world need now? Reflections on regulating technologies” in R Brownsword 
and K Yeung (eds), Regulating Technologies: Legal futures, regulatory frames and technological fixes (Oxford: Hart 2008), 
p. 47. 
40   R Ashcroft, “Could human rights supersede bioethics?” (2010) 10(4) Human Rights Law Review 639, p. 645. 
41   Moore, “Public bioethics and public engagement: the politics of ‘proper talk’”, n. 22 above. 
42   Cf. S Holm, “From steward to Stuart: some problems in deciding for others” and T Hervey, “The European 
Union, its Court of Justice and ‘super-stewardship’ in public health” (containing an extensive review of the 
EU’s deeply contested nature), both developing the EU’s stewardship role in this special issue. 
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citizens to explore further the protean, open-textured and polyvalent nature of stewardship 
so that they might hone a tool for their participation in governance. 
As an indication, in terms of framing, when informed by the WHO, supra-stewardship 
could ensure a focus on “improving overall levels of  population health”43 and “oversight of the 
entire system, avoiding myopia, tunnel vision and the turning of  a blind eye to a system’s 
failings”.44 References to pandemic planning in the WHO and Nuffield versions of 
stewardship do emphasise essential infrastructures, but they are part of a broader attention 
to population and the conditions that support it. Importantly, Nuffield uses pandemic 
influenza as a jumping-off point for considering cross-border obligations, noting how it is 
“also reasonable” to apply stewardship at a “much higher level”.45 The central example 
given – duplicated by the EU and noted as problematic below – is that countries should 
notify others of  a serious infectious disease outbreak, following WHO procedures. Yet, 
since such cross-border obligations require an efficient surveillance system and some 
countries lack such capabilities, richer countries become obligated to “seek to enhance the 
capacities of developing countries to conduct effective surveillance of infectious 
diseases”.46 Surveillance is “not simply a national matter”.47 Interestingly, the ECDC is 
referred to here, alongside the WHO and the Centers for Disease Prevention and Control 
in the United States, as “international partners”.48 
As elaborated below, a focus on pandemics in cross-border governance has implications 
for distribution and vulnerability, both within the EU and in its external relations, and they 
could be teased out by stressing wider public health objectives. For instance, similar to 
Nuffield, the WHO notes the objectives of stewardship “are likely to be framed in terms of 
equity, coverage, access, quality, and patients”49 rights. Baldwin et al. note that stewardship 
means taking account of “different needs arising from factors such as age, gender, ethnic 
background or socio-economic status”.50 Bolstering this is a focus on supporting 
population through the “conditions that allow people to be healthy, focussing attention, in 
particular, on reducing health inequalities”.51 Finally, learning means using engagement around 
the other focal points to open up space for collective and especially institutional learning by 
the EU around uncertainty and ambiguity, the delineation of its responsibility, the 
production of governance distortions and failures, and ways of promoting the uptake and 
use in decision-making of the knowledge produced by citizen participation. 
In drawing on stewardship models, supra-stewardship could derive power from their 
foundation in human rights and bioethics. While others have discussed the advantages and 
disadvantages of  the link between them,52  it is more important here to recognise its 
presence in several international declarations,53 and the scholarly discussion of what that 
 
 
43   “Governance”:  www.who.int/healthsystems/topics/stewardship/en/index.html   (emphasis  added)  
(last accessed 5 September 2011). 
44   “Message”, n. 35 above, p. ix (emphasis added). 
45   Nuffield Council, Public Health, n. 37 above, p. 68 (emphasis added). 
46   Ibid. 
47   Ibid. p. 67. 
48   Ibid. p. 68. 
49   “Governance”, n. 43 above. 
50   Baldwin et al., “Stewardship”, n. 38 above, pp. 115–16. Cf. Nuffield Council, Public Health, n. 38 above, p. 25 
(emphasis added). 
51   Ibid. (emphasis added). 
52   See, generally: Ashcroft, “Could human rights supersede bioethics?”, n. 40 above. 
53   For instance, the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (2005), and in the European context in, 
for instance, the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (the Oviedo Convention 1997) and its protocols. 
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entails. That is, as Ashcroft summarises, whether human rights might “subsume or replace 
bioethics, at least at the level of the public governance of medicine and the life sciences”.54 
Most notable for present purposes is human rights’ capacity, also noted by Ashcroft, and 
highlighted by Montgomery in his discussion of  Nuffield,55 to facilitate communication 
between governance and citizens – as Black explains it, “putting the views of each set of 
participants [in governance] into a language that the others can understand”56 – and to 
provide a rhetorical opening for participation. 
Ashcroft describes the point of particular interest: 
[The potential of human rights in the] hands of activists, at least to disrupt . . . 
by challenging the language, the types of problem recognised . . . and the working methods 
of the public bioethics process. This might particularly be the case where the 
challenge to bioethics comes from groups which have  tried  – and failed – to 
challenge the policy consensus by other methods.57 
In relation to preparedness, and as detailed further in the next section, the groups that might 
benefit most include those whose biology or social status renders them particularly 
vulnerable to infection by pandemic influenza and who have a special interest in public 
health interventions, especially vaccination and social distancing. Figured as “risk groups”, 
they include those with underlying medical conditions, pregnant women, children and 
itinerants. Such individuals and groups might exploit human rights58 to generate “politics 
of life itself ”.59 This potential is recognised in terms such as “moral pioneers”,60 “genetic 
citizens”61 or “biocitizens”.62 These highlight how people come to know and understand 
themselves and relate to others through knowledge of their biological and medical status – 
but nevertheless sometimes demonstrate “biosociality”63 as they work together to reshape 
governance in order to address their concerns. 
In the EU context, the empowering potential of human rights and bioethics has been 
traced more extensively by Flear and Vakulenko.64 Yet, that potential is stressed as replete 
with paradoxes and pitfalls that might reproduce and reinforce the deficit model of citizens 
–  which  might  in  turn  stymie supra-stewardship.  For  instance,  even  as  human  rights 
promises and delivers results when deployed to combat social difference and its attendant 
 
 
 
 
 
 
54   Ashcroft, “Could human rights supersede bioethics?”, n. 40 above, at p. 640. 
55   Cited as a work in progress and discussed in: J Coggon, “What help is a steward? Stewardship, political theory 
and public health law and ethics”, in this special issue. 
56   J Black, “Regulation as facilitation: negotiating the genetic revolution” (1998) 61(5) Modern Law Review 621, 
p. 623. 
57   Ashcroft, “Could human rights supersede bioethics?”, n. 40 above, p. 645 (emphasis added). 
58   W Brown, States of  Injury (Oxford: Princeton UP 1995); W Brown, “Suffering rights as paradoxes” (2000) 7 
Constellations 230. 
59   N Rose, The Politics of Life Itself: Biomedicine, power and subjectivity in the 21st Century (Oxford: Princeton UP 2007). 
60   R Rapp, Testing Women, Testing the Fetus: The social impact of  amniocentesis in America (London: Routledge 2000). 
61   D Heath, R Rapp and K-S Taussig, “Genetic citizenship” in D Night and J Vincent (eds), A Companion to the 
Anthropology of  Politics (Oxford: Blackwell 2004). 
62   N Rose and C Novas, “Biological citizenship” in A Ong and S Collier (eds), Global Assemblages: Technology, 
politics, and ethics as anthropological problems (Oxford: Blackwell 2005). 
63   P Rabinow, Essays on the Anthropology of  Reason (Princeton NJ: Princeton UP 1996); S Gibbon and C Novas 
(eds), Biosocialities, Genetics and the Social Sciences (London: Routledge 2007). 
64   Flear and Vakulenko, “A human rights perspective”, n. 16 above. 
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injustices,65 it can also produce and reinforce social position as identity.66 In moves that 
reinforce the deficit model, conferred top-down in the EU,67 human rights also depoliticises 
and naturalises the social origins of problems, and emphasises and abets moves towards 
self-management  and  individualisation  that  deny  the  potential  of   collective  action  to 
reshape  governance.  More  broadly,  Somsen  queries  the   wisdom  of   developing  a 
precautionary approach within human rights, arguing it effectively provides “governments 
with a blank cheque for limiting individual  liberties”.68  Similarly, stewardship might also 
limit individual autonomy through paternalistic interventions in citizens’ lives. 
Still, given the predominance of risk (and safety and security), human rights’ efforts to 
engage and demonstrate its efficacy – here by instrumentalising public bioethics for citizen 
participation – is surely valuable. Further, safeguards against excessive action and 
paternalism in stewardship that might be deployed in supra-stewardship to resist 
disempowerment are envisaged by the WHO (especially in terms of patients’ rights) and 
Nuffield. In the latter report, public health programmes are constrained by an intervention 
ladder that attempts to minimise “significant limitations on individual freedom”.69  For 
example, while compulsory vaccination can override individual consent, its use should be 
minimised and come with procedural justice arrangements (such as democratic decision- 
making procedures) which provide adequate mandate and justification of  public health 
governance. This sort of requirement provides resources for participation that could 
underpin supra-stewardship. Yet, since the focus is on aligning governance with public 
opinion through scrutiny and expression of  views, and there are no guarantees for a 
substantive input into decision-making, participation is limited and there seems to be a 
denial of citizens’ potential to contribute knowledge.70 
To focus on (public) bioethics in the EU, it is prominent through the introduction of 
ethics committees in the MSs by the Clinical Trials Directive71 and the European Group on 
Ethics. The latter provides the Commission with a comprehensive range of opinions on “all 
areas of the application of science and technology”,72 which have been used to support 
controversial research funding73 and produce “whereas” clauses bolstering the recitals of 
 
 
 
65   For instance, Article 6 amended TEU gives the previously non-binding Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union the same status as the treaties. Further, not only is the European Convention on Human 
Rights noted as a source for the general principles of EU law in Article 6(3) amended TEU, but the EU’s 
accession to the Council of Europe is required under Article 6(2) amended TEU. It might even be said the 
EU – now with its own Fundamental Rights Agency – has become the human rights organisation in Europe. 
On this and key cases see: Flear and Vakulenko, “A human rights perspective”, n. 16 above. 
66   Flear and Vakulenko, “A human rights perspective”, n. 16 above. 
67   Ibid. 
68   H Somsen, “Regulating human genetics in a neo-eugenic era” in T Murphy (ed.), New Technologies and Human 
Rights (Oxford: OUP 2009), p. 116. 
69   Nuffield Council, Public Health, n. 37 above, p. 26. 
70   Ibid. p. 26: stewardship “recognises the importance of  open and transparent  participatory processes as 
a necessary condition for public health policy making,  but it is also clear that these are not 
sufficient by themselves. Stewardship is not exercised simply by following the public vote, especially where 
issues involve complex scientific evidence. Under the stewardship model, public health policy should be 
compatible with the views of the public, and the government should create conditions that allow the public to 
scrutinise and judge the appropriateness of proposed polices.” 
71   Directive 2001/20/EC. 
72   Decision 2005/383/EC. 
73   Opinion 10 – 11 December 1997 – Ethical Aspects of the 5th Research Framework Programme; Opinion 22 
– 13 July 2007 – The Ethics Review of hESC FP7 Research Projects. 
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legislation.74 In addition, the ethical content of the latter is removed from citizen 
contestation to be determined by committees and MS governments.75 Bioethics is designed “to 
ensure that the general public is kept properly informed”76  and to “keep the rapidly advancing 
progress in science in harmony with the ethical values of  all Europeans”.77 Yet, since those 
values are merely represented in expert discourse, the deficit model of citizens re-emerges 
along with expert domination of governance. In short, bioethics has tended to be used less 
to facilitate citizen participation and more as a way of legitimating EU governance of life. 
Even so, as Flear and Vakulenko point out, bioethics has an empowering potential by 
opening up knowledge domains and facilitating discussion – and this could be enhanced by 
the link with human rights and references to mandate and participation.78 
Overall, while stewardship models are, as Coggon asserts, neat but problematic labels,79 
despite their problems and paradoxes, I stick to the basic proposition that supra- 
stewardship is of much use as a tool to facilitate a discursive space for citizen participation 
in preparedness. Indeed, supra-stewardship might be most useful when deployed with 
critical self-consciousness to develop its content and meaning in light of ongoing concerns 
and immediate exigencies – and resist reproduction of the deficit model. 
 
EU preparedness: responsibility, governance  distortions  and failures 
 
ThE  FrAME  ANd rATIoNALITy  oF  prEpArEdNESS 
 
This will become apparent as I suggest how supra-stewardship could produce supplementary 
knowledge for existing technologies of hubris and contribute towards institutional learning 
and decision-making. As a first step, it is necessary to unpack the frame and rationality of 
preparedness in order to then suggest the contours of engagement on its delimitation of EU 
responsibility and some of its broad governance distortions and failures, which are brought 
out by attention to framing, distribution and vulnerability. In the second sub-section, I take 
a closer look at the boundaries of responsibility and distortions and failures relating to two 
key essential infrastructures favoured by preparedness: surveillance and interventions. 
The frame is assembled from EU law and policy. As an indicative overview, in EU law 
public health is recognised and protected through express derogations to the free 
movement of goods, persons and services, which are supplemented by justifications created 
through the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union.80 As such public 
health is central to the EU’s internal market, defined as “an area without internal frontiers 
in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured”.81 Public health 
 
 
74   For instance, Directive 2004/23/EC on Human Tissue and Cells and Regulation 1394/2007 on Advanced 
Therapies. 
75   M Tallacchini, “Governing by values. EU ethics: soft tool, hard effects” (2009) 47 Minerva 281, pp. 293–95. 
76   http://ec.europa.eu/bepa/european-group-ethics/archive-mandates/mandate-1991-1997/index_en.htm 
(emphasis added) (last accessed 5 September 2011) . 
77   Taking European Knowledge Society Seriously: Report of  the Expert Group on Science and  Governance 
(Luxembourg: European Commission 2007), p. 49 (emphasis added). 
78   Flear and Vakulenko, “A human rights perspective”, n. 16 above. 
79   Coggon, “What help is a steward?”, n. 55 above. 
80   For instance: Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentrale AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung (Cassis de Dijon) [1979] ECR 649; Case 
178/84 Commission v Germany (Beer Purity Laws) [1987] ECR 1227; Case C-76/90 Säger v Dennemeyer [1991] ECR 
I-4221; Case C-55/94 Gebhard [1996] ECR I-4165; Case C-237/94 O’Flynn v Adjudication Officer [1996] ECR I 
-2617. See further: C Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU: The four freedoms (Oxford: OUP 2010), pp. 165–87, 
241–2 and 510–8. 
81   Article 26(2) TFEU (emphasis added). The establishment of the internal market is required by Article 3(3) 
amended TEU. 
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is increasingly aligned to security concerns in the traditional understanding of them as being 
about containment, defence and protection, and also in a more Foucauldian vein as being 
about optimising the circulation of people and things and regulating the attendant dangers. 
This is apparent in, for instance, references that the MSs are “resolved to facilitate the free 
movement of persons, while ensuring the safety and security of their peoples, by establishing 
an area of freedom, security and justice”.82 
This concern with security is inflected in Article 168 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the EU (TFEU),83 the treaty base for preparedness, which states a “high level of human 
health protection shall be ensured in the definition and implementation of all Union policies 
and activities”.84 EU action cannot harmonise and is only complementary to that of its 
MSs,85 which maintain responsibilities over “the definition of their health policy and for the 
organisation and delivery of  health services and medical care”.86  However, the MSs are 
required to work in liaison with the Commission to coordinate among themselves their 
policies and programmes in the areas referred to in Article 168(1).87 
Article  168(2)  provides  for  the  adoption  of   measures  including  guidelines  and 
indicators, exchange of best practice, and mechanisms for periodic monitoring and 
evaluation. Under Article 168(1) and (2) such action must be “directed towards improving 
public health . . . obviating sources of  danger to physical and mental health”, and covers “health 
information and education, and monitoring, early warning of and combating serious cross- 
border threats to health”.88 The addition of the final italicised portion to the text of the 
former Article 152 EC seems intended to reflect and provide a concrete basis for EU 
action. Further, Article 168(3) provides both the EU and its MSs “shall foster cooperation 
with third countries and the competent international organisations in the sphere of public health”.89 
With EU law as its foundation, and grounded on a more general scientific approach to 
decision-making established in the EU White Paper European Governance as a response to the 
regulatory failures noted above,90 it is in policy that preparedness is elaborated.91 The focus 
on some of the most important steps in the tightening of the link between public health 
and security, 9/1192  and subsequent terrorist attacks prompted the EU’s “all hazards” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
82   Recital 12 amended TEU (emphasis added). Cf. Article 3(2) amended TEU. See further (including summary 
of legislation): http://europa.eu/pol/justice/index_en.htm (last accessed 5 September 2011). For discussion: 
N Walker (ed.), Europe’s Area of  Freedom, Security and Justice (Oxford: OUP 2004). 
83   Formerly Article 152 EC. 
84   Article 168(1) TFEU (emphasis added). 
85   Harmonisation is precluded by Article 168(5) TFEU. In accordance with  principles  of  subsidiarity 
and proportionality in Article 5 amended TEU. 
86   Article 168(7) TFEU (emphasis added) 
87   A concrete expression of the principle of sincere cooperation in Article 4(3) amended TEU. 
88   Emphasis added. Previously Article 152(1)(1)–(2) EC emphasised  “obviating sources of danger to human 
health” and it did not include a reference to cross-border threats to health. 
89   Emphasis added. 
90   For the EU’s general approach to risk regulation see: European Commission,  “European Governance: A 
White Paper”, COM(2001) 428 final. Cf. Flear and Vakulenko, “A human rights perspective”, n. 16 above. 
91   The documents are available at:  http://ec.europa.eu/health/preparedness_response/policy/index_en.htm 
(last  accessed  5 September 2011). On the link made globally see: Murphy and Whitty,  “Is human 
rights prepared?”, n. 19 above. 
92   F Lentzos, “Rationality, risk and response: a research agenda for biosecurity” (2006) 1(4) BioSocieties 453. 
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approach to biosecurity.93 With public health security established as a priority by the EU’s 
Health Council on 15 November 2001, there followed a Programme of Cooperation on 
Preparedness and Response to Biological and Chemical Attacks [Health Security],94  dealing with 
deliberate human release of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) agents 
within the EU and aimed at “bridging security and health”.95 One of the objectives of this 
plan was the establishment of the Health Security Committee (HSC), which meets twice 
yearly and is composed of high-level representatives from health ministries of the MSs, the 
Commission, the ECDC and the European Medicines Agency (EMA).96 
On 27 November 2001, the Commission began its first notable foray into pandemic 
preparedness planning with a conference to link pandemic influenza with security (titled 
“Preparedness Planning in the Community: Influenza and Other Health Threats”) and 
providing the impetus for next steps.97 With the concern around severe acute respiratory 
syndrome (SARS) and avian influenza in 2003, the link between public health and security 
came to encompass previously unknown diseases whose rapid transmission was facilitated 
by free movement. The importance of such measures was highlighted by the support and 
guidance of the WHO.98 In the wake of this, the remit of the Early Warning and Response 
System  (EWRS)  established  in  199999   was  extended  to  cover  a  wide  range   of 
communicable  diseases,  including  H1N1.100  The  EWRS  is  “a  confidential  computer 
system allowing Member States to send alerts about events with a potential impact on the 
EU,  share  information,  and  coordinate  their  response”101   (consistent  with  the 
 
93   Cf. European Commission, “Green Paper on Bio-preparedness”, COM(2007) 399  final. For discussion: 
S Brem and S Dubois, “Different perceptions, similar reactions: biopreparedness in the European Union” in 
P Katona, J P Sullivan and M D  Intriligator (eds), Global Biosecurity: Threats and responses (London: 
Routledge 
2010). More generally: D P Fidler and L O Gostin, Biosecurity in the Global Age: Biological weapons, public health, 
and the rule of  law (Stanford: Stanford UP 2007); A Lakoff, “Preparing for the next emergency” (2007) 19(2) 
Public Culture 247; S Hinchcliffe and N Bingham, “Securing life: the emerging practices of biosecurity” (2008) 
40(7) Environment and Planning A 1534. 
94   European Commission, “Programme of  Cooperation on Preparedness and  Response to Biological and 
Chemical Attacks [Health Security]” G/FS D(2001) GG. 
95   See:  http://ec.europa.eu/health/preparedness_response/policy/index_en.htm  (last  accessed  5  September 
2011). Subsequently, see: European Commission, “Communication on Cooperation in the European Union 
on Preparedness and Response to Biological and Chemical Agent Attacks (Health Security)”, COM(2003) 320 
final. Also see: European Commission, “Communication on Strengthening Chemical, Biological, Radiological 
and Nuclear Security in the European Union – an EU CBRN Action Plan”, COM(2009) 273 final; European 
Commission, “Commission Staff  Working Document on Strengthening Chemical, Biological, Radiological 
and Nuclear Security in the European Union – an EU CBRN Action Plan. Impact Assessment”, SEC(2009) 
790; European Commission, “Commission Staff Working Document on Strengthening Chemical, Biological, 
[n. 95 cont.] Radiological and Nuclear Security in the European Union – an EU CRBN Action Plan. Summary 
of  Impact Assessment”, SEC(2009)  791; European Commission, “Commission Staff  Working 
Document Bridging  Security and Health: Towards the Identification of  Good Practices in the  
Response  to CBRN Incidents and the Security of CBR Substances”, SEC(2009) 874. 
96   Especially representatives of Directorate-General for Health and Consumers: 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/health_consumer/index_en.htm (last accessed 5 September 2011). 
97   http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_threats/com/Influenza/influenza_conference_1.htm (last accessed 
5 September 2011). 
98   European Commission, “Communication on Strengthening Coordination on Generic Preparedness Planning 
for Public Health Emergencies at EU Level”, COM(2005) 605 final, p. 3. 
99   Decision  2119/98/EC  Establishing  Network  for  the  Epidemiological   Surveillance  and  Control  of 
Communicable Diseases and Decision 2000/57/EC11 on the EWRS. 
100 http://ec.europa.eu/health/communicable_diseases/diseases/index_en.htm#A (last  accessed 5 September 
2011). 
101 http://ec.europa.eu/health/communicable_diseases/early_warning/comm_legislation_en.htm (last accessed 5 
September 2011). 
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International Health Regulations).102 Surveillance data from the EWRS is collated into a 
report by the ECDC.103 This move strengthened the knowledge available to MSs  and 
enhanced their ability to limit contagion. 
On 26 March 2004, the Commission began to step up its engagement with pandemic 
influenza planning, and as an “important step” established a Public Health Preparedness and 
Response Planning Group (PHPRPG) in the HSC to advise it on the actions to be taken in 
the event of an imminent pandemic threat.104 On 28 November 2005, there followed the 
Communication  on  Pandemic  Influenza  Preparedness  and  Response  Planning  in  the  European 
Community,105   which  updated  planning  in  light  of  WHO  recommendations  and  the 
establishment of the ECDC, also in 2005. This uses “the principles and components of . . . 
generic preparedness planning”,106 such as in the Communication on Strengthening Coordination on 
Generic Preparedness Planning for Public Health Emergencies at EU Level107 and the Interim Document: 
Technical Guidance on Generic Preparedness Planning for Public Health Emergencies (interim document).108 
As such, I draw on generic preparedness only where it helps to elaborate on pandemic 
preparedness. The Commission and the ECDC have also been actively engaged with the 
WHO, joint international workshops109 and global meetings to discuss planning with third 
countries,110 including the Global Health Security Initiative (GHSI), an informal, international 
partnership that works to strengthen health preparedness and response globally.111 
Importantly, in February 2007, the Health Council agreed on a transitional prolongation 
and extension of  HSC’s mandate to encompass the threads traced above: public health 
preparedness and response to CBRN attacks; generic preparedness and response for public 
 
102 The International Health Regulations (IHR) require WHO MSs to notify the WHO of any potential international 
public  health  emergency  (World  Health  Assembly,   International  Health  Regulations  (2005),  available  at 
www.who.int/csr/ihr/IHRWHA58_3-en.pdf (last accessed 5 September 2011)), and are rendered applicable 
to the EU under Article 57(1) IHR, which states the IHR and EU Treaties “should be interpreted so as to be 
compatible”. The Commission “believes the EU and its [MSs] can and should work together to optimise IHR 
implementation in the context of the EU policies and health related actions and initiatives” (see press release: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/06/1276 (last accessed 5 September 2011)). 
103 For instance, Annual Epidemiological Report on Communicable Diseases in Europe 2009 (Stockholm: ECDC 2010), 
available at http://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications/Publications/1011_SUR_Annual_Epidemiological_ 
Report_on_Communicable_Diseases_in_Europe.pdf (last accessed 5 September 2011). 
104 See    http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_threats/com/Influenza/influhome/influenza_level_en.htm    (last 
accessed 5 September 2011). 
105 European Commission, “Communication on Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response Planning in the 
European Community”, COM(2005) 607 final. 
106 Ibid. p. 7. 
107 European Commission, “Generic Preparedness”, n. 98 above. 
108 European Commission, “‘Interim Document’: Technical Guidance on Generic  Preparedness Planning for 
Public Health Emergencies”, 2005. This addresses in martial tones, “threats and emergencies which are affecting 
or are likely to affect public  health in more than one Member State” (ibid. p. 65, emphasis added). 
The guidance includes checklists “as a guide that may be used to assist in the development, revision or 
assessment of comprehensiveness of preparedness plans” (ibid. p. 3) and facilitate the “inter-operability of  
national plans, mainly by the creation of co-ordination mechanisms and analysis and communication tools that 
enhance co-operation between key  Member States and Commission players” (ibid. p. 2, emphasis added), 
and lay the  basis for “reviews, validations and tests and making recommendations for improvements and 
fine-tuning of national plans and EU procedures to reduce vulnerabilities and incompatibilities” (ibid. emphasis 
added). 
109 2–3 March 2005 in Luxembourg, 24–26 October 2005 in Copenhagen, 15–17 May  2006 in Uppsala, 
and 25–27  September  2007  in  Luxembourg.  See  further:   http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_threats/com/ 
Influenza/influhome/influenza_level_en.htm (last accessed 5 September 2011). 
110 For instance, “Vienna Senior Officials Meeting on Avian and Human Pandemic”, 6 and 7 June 2006. See 
http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_threats/com/Influenza/SOM_Vienna.pdf (last accessed 5 September 2011). 
111 See www.ghsi.ca/english/index.asp (last accessed 5 September 2011). 
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health emergencies; and, most significantly, influenza preparedness and response.112 The link 
between public health and security was augmented further by the identification of “protecting 
people from health threats” as one of three key objectives of 2007’s Together for Health: A 
Strategic  Approach  for  the  EU  2008–2013.113   This  encompasses  communicable,  non- 
communicable and rare diseases, vaccination, and preparedness and response to health threats. 
Preparedness operationalises, and is framed by, this dense link between public health and 
security in order to deal with a pandemic, which is constructed as a medical emergency. It is 
a useful supplement to public health’s traditional focus on prevention, which relies on 
archival–statistical knowledge, but which by definition becomes of limited use in contexts 
of high uncertainty. Unsurprisingly, then, preparedness is the pervasive governance response 
for dealing with highly ambiguous and uncertain (low-probability, high-harm) risks,114 
engendering a “policy revolution”,115 propelling us into “the age of preparedness”.116  As 
Collier  and  Lakoff  put  it,  generally  preparedness  requires  imaginative  enactment  and 
“demands that experts constantly assess the vulnerability of vital systems and the readiness to respond 
to, and recover from, events that threaten them”.117 This is echoed by the Commission, which 
uses previous experience to imagine pandemic scenarios118 and notes “the ability to respond 
to an international threat to health is profoundly influenced by the extent to which the issues 
have been considered in advance and plans are in place for co-ordinated action”.119 
Yet, as Collier and Lakoff  go on to say, generally the goal of  preparedness “is not 
necessarily to prevent events from happening but to mitigate their consequences – in other 
words, to keep a disaster from turning into a catastrophe”.120 This is reflected in statements 
by the Commission. For example, preparedness is “directed towards identifying and 
addressing the current impact and subsequent threat potential of the influenza outbreak in 
order to limit its consequences”121 – especially to the internal market.122 Still, in producing a 
“synergy” to the mutual benefit of  public health and security such as in relation to 
surveillance and interventions, preparedness might have some use in bolstering efforts and 
resources to deal with pandemics as a medical emergency.123 Indeed, as Rothstein et al. 
point out, a focus on so-called “institutional risk” (the “government of governments”) can 
 
112 In response to: European Commission, “Communication on Transitional Prolongation and Extension of the 
Mandate of the Health Security Committee in View of a Future General Revision of the Structures 
Dealing with Health Threats at EU Level”, COM(2006) 699 final. 
113 European Commission, “White Paper, Together for Health: A Strategic Approach for the EU 2008–2013”, 
COM(2007) 630 final; European Commission, “Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying White 
Paper, Together for Health: A Strategic Approach for the EU 2008–2013”, SEC(2007) 1376. For an overview 
of  initiatives,  see European Commission, “Commission Staff  Working Document, Report on  European 
Governance  (2003–2004)”,  SEC(2004)  1153.  Also  see:   
http://ec.europa.eu/health/strategy/policy/ index_en.htm (last accessed 5 September 2011). 
114 R Ericson and A Doyle, Uncertain Business: Risk, insurance and the limits of  knowledge (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press 2004); S J Collier, “Enacting catastrophe: preparedness, insurance, budgetary rationalization” 
(2008) 37(2) Economy and Society 224; A Lakoff, “From population to vital system” in A Lakoff and S Collier 
(eds),  Biosecurity Interventions (Chichester: Columbia UP 2008); P O’Malley, Risk, Uncertainty  and 
Government (London: Glasshouse Press 2004). 
115 Fidler and Gostin, Biosecurity, n. 93 above, p. 145. 
116 Murphy and Whitty, “Is human rights prepared?”, n. 19 above, pp. 230 and 232. 
117 S Collier and A Lakoff, “Vital systems security” (2007) ARC Working Paper No 2, p. 3 (emphasis added). 
118 For instance, European Commission, “Interim Document”, n. 108 above. 
119 Ibid. p. 3 (emphasis added). 
120 Ibid. 
121 European Commission, “Pandemic Influenza Preparedness”, n. 105 above, p. 8 (emphasis added). 
122 Ibid. and European Commission, “Interim Document”, n. 108 above. 
123 See further, Fidler and Gostin, Biosecurity, n. 93 above, ch. 5. 
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figure the approach taken to “societal risks” (like H1N1).124 Advantages of this include the 
sensitisation of the EU to pandemic influenza, more and coordinated research, 
professionalisation of the problem and a stronger basis for decision-making. 
However, such potential benefits are what de Larrinaga and Doucet call “part of the 
wager” of securitisation of public health by and through the construction of a pandemic 
as a medical emergency.125 Securitisation is a speech act and force that redounds below, 
especially in relation to distribution and vulnerability concerns around interventions. 
Security provides the “conditions of possibility for liberalism’s central tenet of 
freedom”,126 what Foucault describes as “the possibility of movement, change of place, 
and processes of  circulation of  both people and things”.127  As such, optimisation of 
freedom creates demands for increased security and an all too easy resort to the exceptional 
measures it favours – that is, more preparedness through a focus on protection of essential 
infrastructures, especially surveillance and interventions.128 Balzacq summarises the point: 
the “social design of a security problem conditions and legitimates the kind of  means used to stop 
it” and as such it is a “normative political act”.129 
Moreover, as de Larrinaga and Doucet explain, the governmentalisation of  security 
means it is increasingly understood in neoliberal terms as being about the optimisation of 
the health and wealth of  (non-state) populations and “assessment of  threats . . . pays 
particular attention to the global and transboundary circulation of  threats to [them]”.130 In a 
reflexive way this is to be achieved through the protection of vulnerable governance rather 
than vulnerable populations. As already apparent, and detailed further below, this is 
accomplished by assembling, linking together and leveraging support from various 
discourses, knowledges, scientific and bureaucratic techniques and practices from a range of 
national, supranational and global actors and sources.131 References to inter alia the 
Commission, HSC, ECDC, MSs, WHO and GHSI, and their gathering and deployment of 
pandemic and risk knowledge, highlight the securitisation of public health and 
governmentalisation of security as being underpinned by an expert rationality. 
To clarify, the broadest governance distortion is the emphasis on and distribution of 
resources towards protecting essential infrastructures – planning and coordination, 
monitoring and assessment, prevention and containment, health system response and 
communication – which attempt to mitigate catastrophe in the face of  a pandemic 
medical emergency and ensure the EU is only indirectly formally responsible for 
population. To quote Black, this also sets in train “decisions as to which types of failures an 
organisation is willing to tolerate” – failures in the direct protection of population – “and 
 
 
 
 
 
 
124 H Rothstein, M Huber and G Gaskell, “A theory of  risk colonization: the  spiralling regulatory logics 
of societal and institutional risk” (2006) 35(1) Economy and Society 91. 
125 M de Larrinaga and M G Doucet, Security and Global Governmentality: Globalisation,  governance and the state 
(London: Routledge 2010), p. 1. 
126 Ibid. p. 7. 
127 Foucault, Security, n. 26 above, pp. 48–9. 
128 Generally, see De Larrinaga and Doucet, Security and Global Governmentality, n. 125 above. 
129 T Balzacq, “Preface” in Securitisation Theory: How security problems emerge and dissolve (London: Routledge 2011), 
p. xiii. 
130 De Larrinaga and Doucet, Security and Global Governmentality, n. 125 above , p. 17 (emphasis added). 
131 J Huysmans, The Politics of  Insecurity: Fear, migration and asylum in the EU (London: Routledge 2006). 
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which it is not”132  – failures in the protection of  essential infrastructures in order  to 
optimise the economy. 
As Black continues, these choices “are linked to attempts to define the parameters of 
blame. Through risk-based frameworks, regulators are attempting to define what, to their 
minds, are the acceptable limits of their responsibility and hence accountability”.133 It does not appear 
that improvisation134 is to be avoided or eliminated even as interoperability of MS plans is 
the focus, and given that, as traced below, it is built into planning. However, improvisation 
does seem to be constrained – and responsibilities limited to protection of  essential 
infrastructures in order to optimise the economy, governance distorted and certain failures 
envisaged – by the construction of preparedness. Requiring far more discussion, below I 
focus only on pharmaceutical interventions as the key medical emergency triage choice. 
Clearly, attention to framing reveals the pandemic “threat”, the governance planning 
response, and its attendant distortions and failures as fabrications with profound normative 
implications. Yet, as Balzacq states, “those who define a threat can be held accountable, as 
threats” – and planning, its attempted limitation of responsibility and production of 
governance distortions and failures – “are also the product of  their entrepreneurship”.135 
Reference to the alert phases helps to bring out the centrality and importance of the 
focus on the protection of essential infrastructures. To overview the phases, they are based 
on EU generic planning alert phases, which are in turn based explicitly on WHO Phases 
1–6. The inter-pandemic period is at Phases 1 and 2. At this stage no new influenza virus 
subtypes have been detected in humans, but they might be present in animals. The main 
public health goal at this stage is to “strengthen influenza pandemic preparedness at the 
global, regional, national and sub-national levels”136 and minimisation of the risk of 
transmission to humans. This requires rapid detection and reporting of any such 
transmission. The Commission and the ECDC work in consultation with the HSC, and in 
cooperation with the WHO, to assess, review and organise “exercises concerning national 
pandemic plans, with a special focus on their interoperability”.137 
Phases 3 to 5 are the pandemic alert period. At Phases 3 and 4, there are no human cases 
in the EU, but a risk of sporadic importation of isolated cases in MSs. Rapid characterisation 
of the new virus subtype and early detection, notification and response to new cases are the 
main public health objectives. At Phase 4, containing the new virus within a limited area or 
delaying its spread in order to implement preparedness counter-measures, such as the 
development of vaccine, is the main public health objective. At Phase 5, there are larger 
clusters of cases outside the EU, but human-to-human contagion is still limited in area. The 
main public health objective is to “maximize efforts to contain or delay spread, to possibly 
avert a pandemic, and to gain time to implement pandemic response measures”.138 
 
 
 
132 J Black, “The emergence of  risk-based regulation and the new public risk  management in the 
United Kingdom” (2005) Public Law 512, p. 513 (emphasis added). On failure cf. J Downer, “Anatomy of 
disaster: why some accidents are unavoidable” (2010) CARR Discussion Paper 61. 
133 Ibid. p. 514 (emphasis added). 
134 Cf. G Gorgoni, “‘(Pre)caution Improvisation Area’: Improvisation and responsibility in the practice of the 
precautionary   principle”   (2010)   6(1)   Critical   Studies   in   Improvisation   at:   www.criticalimprov.com/ 
article/view/1086/1727 (last accessed 5 September 2011). Thanks to Thérèse Murphy and Sara Ramshaw for 
these insights. 
135 Balzacq, “Preface”, n. 129 above, p. xiii (emphasis added). 
136 European Commission, “Pandemic Influenza Preparedness”, n. 105 above, p. 16. 
137 Ibid. 
138 Ibid. p. 21. 
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Phase 6 is the pandemic period in which there is now an increased and sustained 
transmission of  cases around the world and in the EU’s general population. The main 
public health objective is minimising the pandemic’s impact in the EU. In order to do so, 
the EU adopts its own Alert Levels 1–4. These take into account specifics such as the 
absence of internal borders, and differences between MSs (southern and eastern MSs have 
higher susceptibility). At EU Alert Level 1 there are no human cases in the EU, but there is 
a very high risk of sporadic imported cases. At EU Alert Level 2 there is a single human 
case inside the EU. EU Alert Level 3 occurs when there is an isolated cluster in one EU MS 
or sustained transmission between humans with several clusters inside the EU. EU Alert 
Level 4 is when there are cases in one or more MSs. 
This phasing serves to modulate and shape preparedness by further specifying and 
limiting responsibilities and (improvisation of) actions in response to events towards, and 
establishing the boundaries of accountability and blame for failures in, the protection of 
essential infrastructures. For example, planning and coordination is aimed at “improving 
coordination and communication” to ensure the EU is of “added value”.139 The PHPRPG 
is required to review MS preparedness plans and ensure the identification and dissemination 
of “expertise and good practice”140 and the EWRS must be used for notification of cases 
and exchange of information on measures taken. 
The ECDC sets the terms of  reference for Outbreak Assistance Teams (OATs).141 
These participate in “outbreak investigation inside and outside the Community ensuring 
coherence and synergies with the EU’s external response in co-operation with the WHO”.142 
Generally, the Commission is responsible for reviewing its own internal contingency and 
coordinating guidance to national authorities so that they can review and update their plans 
in light of evidence.143 More specifically, at Phase 5, Commission staff surge capacity must 
be ensured, and at Phase 6 a centre to coordinate EU and international level actions and 
evaluate effectiveness must be established. Surveillance is dealt with in monitoring and 
assessment, and it provides the information upon which hinges the alert threat-level and the 
use of countermeasures such as vaccines. Indeed, “early detection and characterisation of 
pandemic strains”144 is the “most important”145 task. I elaborate on this, and interventions 
dealt with in prevention and containment, in the second sub-section. 
To reflect further, the limitation of responsibility to the focus on, and distribution of 
resources towards, protecting essential infrastructures, such as surveillance, surge capacity 
and, as emphasised below, interventions like pharmaceuticals as the preferred triage 
choice, masks and is detrimental to wider public health objectives and increases the 
vulnerability of those who lose out as a consequence. Francis et al. point out how, while 
the “apparent assumption that devoting resources to pandemic planning is just” might be 
explained by the openness of  the “triage choices in pandemic planning”, nevertheless 
 
 
 
 
 
 
139 European Commission, “Pandemic Influenza Preparedness”, n. 105 above, p. 8. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Ibid. 
142 Ibid. 
143 Ibid. p. 17. 
144 Ibid. p. 8. 
145 Ibid. 
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“there are serious questions of  justice to be asked about the allocation of extensive resources 
to pandemic threats.”146 
Indeed, Fidler and Gostin note that preparedness might skew resources towards rare 
events like pandemic influenza “at the expense of tackling health problems that cause the 
great death and illness in populations daily”.147 Similarly, others stress that preparedness 
might skew resources towards communicable diseases at the expense of non-communicable 
diseases and persistent public health problems.148 This is perhaps of  greater concern in 
terms of external relations. There are efforts at international collaboration, especially with 
poorer countries, such as in relation to pharmaceuticals, elaborated below, and the ECDC’s 
organisation and deployment of OATs abroad. Yet the EU’s focus on protection becomes 
nuanced to being about its essential infrastructures. This could be mirrored in external 
effects by skewing resource allocation in countries with already poorly equipped health-care 
systems towards protection of their essential infrastructures, but in order to protect the EU. 
This is ultimately to the detriment of  their already strained public health capacities and 
vulnerable populations. 
Moreover, it is noteworthy that prior to Phase 6 the EU is deemed free of pandemic 
infection. This amounts to an externalisation of public health problems caused by failures 
of law, policy and medical practice in the EU, such as so-called MRSA and C difficile,149 
which are naturalised as part of the order of things, and consequently there is no one to 
blame. Despite efforts at international cooperation there remains a bias towards EU needs 
and the idea that, rather than being endemic to the operation of the EU’s privileging of free 
movement, the “threat” comes from “out there”. In short, there is much need for 
highlighting concerns around framing, distribution and vulnerability in order to avoid 
“myopia”.150 As Murphy and Whitty explain, without attention to broader social conditions 
and public health concerns, such as sufficient staff  and resources overall and reducing 
inequalities, “global surveillance, surge capacity and, more generally, preventing and coping 
with a pandemic will be all the more difficult”.151 
Four main imbricating forces are worthy of attention given they might work to 
undergird and reinforce the delineation of  responsibility and production of  governance 
distortions and failures. A first force is a more specific valence of securitisation. To quote 
de Larrinaga and Doucet, security is increasingly prevalent and powerful, as indicated by the 
way in which ‘“greater security’ has come to trump so easily other available political 
discourses”.152 Linked closely to this is a second force: the dissemination of the wider zero- 
sum relationship between human rights and risk (and safety and security). Lazarus and 
Goold observe the power of “the idea that certain human rights can be ‘turned off ’ when 
necessary” has become a “thoroughly reasonable reaction to the dangers allegedly faced by 
 
 
 
 
146 L P Francis, M P Battin, J A Jacobson and C B Smith, “Pandemic planning and distributive justice in health 
care” in M Freeman (ed.), Law and Bioethics (Oxford: OUP 2008), p. 433 (emphasis added). Cf. consideration 
of   social   justice   in   pandemic   planning in: “Bellagio Statement of Principles”, available at: 
www.unicef.org/avianflu/files/Bellagio_Statement.pdf and   www.bioethicsinstitute.org/web/page/905/ 
sectionid/377/pagelevel/3/interior.asp (last accessed 5 September 2011). 
147 Fidler and Gostin, Biosecurity, n. 93 above, p. 8. 
148 D Yach, S R Leeder, J Bell and B Kistmasamy, “Global chronic diseases” (2005) 307 Science 317. 
149 S Jenkins, “Swine flu? A panic stoked in order to posture and spend”, The Guardian, 29 April 2009. 
150 Cf. Francis et al., “Pandemic planning and distributive justice in health care”, n. 146 above, p. 446. 
151 Murphy and Whitty, “Is human rights prepared?”, n. 19 above, at 243. 
152 De Larrinaga and Doucet, Security and Global Governmentality, n. 125 above, p. 1 (emphasis added). 
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democratic societies”.153 Abetting this is a broader tendency stressed by Hunter in which 
“all aspects of  health emergency policy have shifted towards the framework of  enhanced 
executive authority”.154 Going so far as to describe this zero-sum game as part of the “new 
‘rights revolution’”,155 Murphy and Whitty note “there are no guarantees that the 
securitisation of  public health, the right to security or human security will be good for 
human rights”.156 
What Rothstein et al. term “institutional risk” also has another valence and it is the 
third force. That is, a focus on institutional risk might transform and reduce preparedness 
techniques into instrumental tick-box exercises and be detrimental to the efficient 
management of the societal risk of pandemics. Wider moves towards reflexive 
governance – a focus on inter alia institutions and their means of action – might 
exacerbate and underpin this focus on institutional risk. Since the object of these various 
moves is economic optimisation, they might also ensure governance openly serves the 
economy. Below I suggest this is apparent in the preference for protection of 
pharmaceutical interventions. 
To tease out the point about legitimation, this final main force is especially important 
in light of inter alia the failures noted above leading to the EU’s renewed interest in risk 
governance in European Governance, successive democratic rejections of Treaty 
amendments, and a wider “democratic deficit”.157 Preparedness helps to constitute and 
project the EU’s identity as authoritative and useful to its citizens, MSs, international actors 
and private actors like corporations, especially given worldwide moves towards “greater 
security”. Preparedness and its attendant distortions and failures might be augmented and 
facilitated by the resources and openings for action and the  production of  “output” 
legitimacy158 it provides. 
In other words, constructing pandemic influenza as a “threat” in a medical emergency 
model, and then a “risk” that must be governed in the present,159 enlarges power and the 
possibility of action160 – and, as noted, it conditions and legitimates the means used. As a 
twist, Power observes that democratic ideals “are increasingly positioned within ideals for 
good governance of  the risk analysis process”.161  This highlights  preparedness as being 
partly about rendering the EU auditable and inspectable – and relating to and managing 
 
153 L Lazarus and B J Goold, “Security and human rights: the search for a language  of  reconciliation” 
in B J Goold and L Lazarus (eds), Security and Human Rights (Oxford: Hart 2007), p. 4. Also see: G J 
Annas, American Bioethics: Crossing human  rights and health law boundaries (Oxford: OUP 2005); L O 
Gostin, “When terrorism threatens health: how far are limitations on personal and economic liberties 
justified?” (2003) 55 
Florida Law Review 1105; I Loader and N Walker, Civilising Security (Cambridge: CUP 2007); B Von Tigerstrom, 
Human Security and International Law: Prospects and problems (Oxford: Hart 2007). 
154 N Hunter, “‘Public–private’ health law: multiple directions in public health” (2007) 10 Journal of  Health Care 
Law and Policy 101, p. 106 (emphasis added). 
155 Murphy and Whitty, “Is human rights prepared?”, n. 19 above, p. 231. Also see T Murphy, “Taking revolutions 
seriously: rights, risk and new technologies” (2009) 16(1) Maastricht Journal of  European and Comparative Law 
15–39. 
156 Murphy and Whitty, “Is human rights prepared?”, ibid. p. 232. 
157 In general, see C Scott, “Accountability in the regulatory state” (2000) 27 Journal  of   Law and Society 
38; F Scharpf,  Governing  in  Europe.  Effective  and  democratic?  (Oxford:  OUP  1999);  A  Arnull  and  D  
Wincott, Accountability and Legitimacy in the European Union (Oxford: OUP 2002). 
158 Scharpf, Governing in Europe, ibid. 
159 Cf. Lentzos, n. 92 above, p. 461. F Ewald, “Insurance and risk” in G Burchell, C Gordon and P Miller (eds), 
The Foucault Effect. Studies in governmentality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1991). 
160 S Sontag, Illness as Metaphor and AIDS and its Metaphors (London: Penguin 1991), especially p. 175. 
161 M Power, Organized Uncertainty (Oxford: OUP 2007), p. 20 (emphasis added). 
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“public expectations”.162 More specifically, risk – and preparedness – is partly an exercise 
in governing “unruly perceptions” and maintaining the “production of  legitimacy in the face 
of these perceptions”.163 
Relating to and managing public expectations occurs principally through 
communication, itself  an essential infrastructure. This draws on the general approach 
established in European Governance in which openness, transparency, and accountability are 
to be ensured, and governance legitimated, by inter alia the provision of up-to-date and 
easily available (principally online) information on EU law and policymaking and, in 
preparedness, pandemic news media “status” updates.164  Each alert phase has its own 
communication plan, reflecting the seriousness of  the threat, and based on information 
gathered through surveillance. For example, throughout the alert phases it is for MS 
authorities to communicate arrangements for vaccination and distribution of  antiviral 
agents to health professionals and the public. 
Further, at Phase 3 the Commission, the ECDC and MSs must work together in order 
to coordinate the sharing of “accurate messages” about, inter alia, the global 
epidemiological situation (including spread and effectiveness of  counter-measures). At 
Phase 4 (and similarly at Phases 5 and 6) the Commission and ECDC must work to promote 
“sharing of templates for general health education materials”165 and the MSs must share 
their intended “public and educational material”.166 The ECDC is charged with providing 
“the scientific appraisal of recommended measures”167 and, as stressed at Phase 6, it has a 
central role in making briefings from the EU to other actors, including the public. 
Fast exchange of information and: 
prompt notification during the first stages of a pandemic influenza are essential 
in enabling [MSs], the Commission, the ECDC, WHO and  other bodies to 
respond with common positions in public communications,  and alert properly their 
structures, so that measures can be implemented in a timely manner.168 
As such, MS public authorities should “communicate effectively with the public and the 
media before and in anticipation of  events that may lead to public health emergencies”.168a 
Messages are to be coordinated,169 and this should occur early on in any major incident, so 
as to ensure they establish “themselves as the leading, if not the only, source of authoritative 
information”,170 and so as to avoid an “information void”171 and subsequent speculation, 
rumour and confusion. This is facilitated through a “range of ready to use media briefing 
 
 
162 Power, Organized Uncertainty, n. 161 above, pp. 20–1. 
163 Ibid. p. 21 (emphasis added). Of course, besides citizens other addressees of the demonstration of action 
afforded by the rhetoric of preparedness include the MSs and international actors such as the WHO and 
GHSI (all leveraging support from EU action). 
164 For instance, http://europa.eu/press_room/press_packs/influenza/index_en.htm; www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/ 
healthtopics/influenza/Pages/index.aspx;   http://ec.europa.eu/health/communicable_diseases/diseases/ 
influenza/h1n1/index_en.htm (all last accessed 5 September 2011). 
165 European Commission, “Pandemic Influenza Preparedness”, n. 105 above, p. 20. 
166 Ibid. p. 21. 
167 Ibid. 
168 Ibid. p. 14 (emphasis added). Cf. European Commission, “Generic Preparedness”, n. 98 above, p. 6. 
168a European Commission, “Generic Preparedness”, ibid. p. 7 (emphasis added). 
169 For instance, the Commission’s October 2005 technical guidance document on Procedure for Communication to 
Member States, the Commission and the ECDC about Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Events in Humans, cited in 
European Commission, “Pandemic Influenza Preparedness”, n. 105 above, p. 14. 
170 European Commission, “Generic Preparedness”, n. 98 above, p. 7. 
171 Ibid. p. 13. 
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materials about influenza”,172 including, basic information about the disease and the 
response systems in place, and clear and timely flows of information facilitated by 24/7 
“operational contact points in the Member States and in the Commission”,173 and 
encompassing “text, voice, and video”.174 
In relating to and managing public expectations, communication is concerned with 
establishing and limiting the boundaries of  EU responsibility and blame in the public 
imagination to failures in the protection of finite and easily identifiable essential 
infrastructures and legitimating governance and the means used to deal with a pandemic 
medical emergency. The rhetoric of risk is, to quote Black, a “useful legitimating device”.175 
The EU is able to produce legitimacy through its centrality to communication, and in a 
neoliberal vein it does so through ensuring the output of an optimised and secure internal 
market: the “distribution of  accurate and timely information . . . is critical in order to 
minimise unwanted and unforeseen social disruption and economic consequences and to maximise 
the effective outcome of the response”.176 Such a focus might reinforce the zero-sum 
relationship between human rights and risk (and safety and security) and the legitimacy of 
using means favoured by security. 
A focus on output legitimacy is also abetted by the limited construction of  citizens 
within the deficit model as key addressees of  communication. That is, consistent with 
Article 168(1)(2), preparedness relates to, animates and manages citizens through health 
information and education materials. It is noted that it: 
will help reinforce public confidence in the response strategy if Member States and the 
Commission can demonstrate that the national strategies across the  EU are 
consistent and based on a common assessment of the relevant science.177 
This statement also reveals the limited nature of democratic ideals within risk 
governance. Communication is used to produce limited “input” in order to support and 
authorise preparedness. As such, this public rationality complements and buttresses the 
expert rationality, its depoliticisation and naturalisation of preparedness, the limited 
boundaries of  responsibility, and the production of  governance distortions and failures. 
Citizens do, however, have some input through surveillance and information-gathering. Yet, 
even then citizens are only one source among many,178 and participation does not appear 
to extend to shaping and directing the form and broader focus of  governance, or to 
identifying its distortions and failures. 
This betrays an inflection with PUS which is also found in documents constituting the 
EU’s overarching approach to risk governance, especially European Governance and Science and 
Society.179  PUS is an instrument used to support the overarching agenda of  producing 
 
 
172 European Commission, “Generic Preparedness”, n. 98 above, p. 13. 
173 Ibid. p. 7. 
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economic optimisation.180 Perhaps the most notable PUS technique used in preparedness is 
the  Eurobarometer  on  attitudes  to  pandemic  planning.181  Another  is  questionnaires,  for 
instance, through the Stakeholder Consultation on Strengthening European Union  Preparedness  on 
Pandemic Influenza.182  These are used to produce statistics and reports  on  strengthening 
governance. They conjure citizens, their understanding of pandemic science, and therefore the 
appropriate relationship between citizens and governance (which reinforces the importance of 
“tooling-up”  through  supra-stewardship).  So-called  “absent  presences”,183   citizens  are 
represented and imagined by EU actors in order to provide  a democratic basis for their 
decisions. Importantly, PUS is controlled by experts who attempt to shape and define citizen 
and “public” identities and attitudes within the deficit model as being in need of education.184 
Such a prior framing of public understanding denies the normative dimension of 
preparedness and attempts to “mark off ” governance from popular control and contestation. 
Overall, the complementary expert and public rationalities in preparedness highlight 
how, to quote Walklate and Mythen’s observation, “expert institutions deploy discourses of 
risk to filter information, buttress dominant norms and to muffle political opposition”.185 
This tendency might be reinforced by the way in which preparedness literally governs and 
attempts to quiet citizens through their feelings of insecurity.186 
 
A cLoSEr  Look  AT  SUrvEILLANcE  ANd  INTErvENTIoNS 
 
Citizens could also hone supra-stewardship to take a closer look at surveillance and 
interventions. Here, I focus on some further contours for engagement that highlight how 
the framing of preparedness as being about dealing with a medical emergency impacts on 
distribution and vulnerability. Beginning with and elaborating on surveillance, throughout 
the alert phases, the ECDC works with the Commission, other EU agencies and MS 
authorities to coordinate epidemiological surveillance, especially through the EWRS.187 
Surveillance information is used to identify the circumstances of infection and to produce 
“risk groups”. These might be subject to containment and control measures, discussed 
below as interventions. At Phase 4, the risk groups and counter-measures are put under 
enhanced surveillance, and this attention heightens at Phase 5 when there might be 
importation of cases, and again at Phase 6 with the circulation of the pandemic in the EU. 
 
180 Jasanoff, Designs on Nature, n. 11 above, p. 251. 
181 See   http://ec.europa.eu/health/communicable_diseases/diseases/influenza/h1n1/docs/eurobarometer 
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final section is about multi-sectoral preparedness, which has been highlighted as an area for development. 
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impression is  that  the  deficit  model  is  being  reproduced.  See  further  
http://ec.europa.eu/yourvoice/ipm/forms/ dispatch?form=pandemicinfluenzan (last accessed 5 September 
2011). 
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186 Cf. Lentzos and Rose, “Governing insecurity”, n. 8 above, p. 235. 
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As Jasanoff explains, generally the production of risk groups is an “effort to produce 
policy-relevant assessments”188 of those thought to be differently and most affected by 
the threat in question and to attune governance to them and their needs. This might work 
to protect the vulnerable and interrupt a pandemic.189 One concern addressed shortly is 
how preparedness reshapes the value and use of risk groups. Another concern, discussed 
further below, is whether risk groups made subject to governance interventions have their 
human rights protected or in fact become, as an example, “at risk” of  stigmatisation and 
excessive use of  counter-measures.190 Here, I focus on the  production of  risk groups 
from  supposedly  neutral  scientific  knowledge.  This  works  with  moves  towards  self- 
management  and  individualisation  of   responsibility  to   depoliticise  and  naturalise 
governance,  and  it  reinforces  the  expert  rationality  underpinning  preparedness  and 
undermines democratic contestation.191 
The latter is assisted by the re-emergence of  the complementary public rationality 
through the use of physical and biological indicators to construct those at risk. Requiring 
further attention in relation to preparedness, Jasanoff notes how generally such 
“classifications tend to overlook the social foundations of  vulnerability, and to subordinate 
individual experiences of  risk to aggregate numerical calculations”.192 The at-risk human is 
treated as a “passive agent”193 whose sociality and sources of vulnerability are masked. This 
increases the need for citizens to “regain their status as active subjects, rather than remain 
undifferentiated objects in yet another expert discourse”.194 
Turning to interventions, these fall within the essential infrastructure of prevention and 
containment. Vaccines and social distancing are central and are modulated throughout the 
alert levels. It is noted that “hand-washing and social distancing will play important roles in 
reducing the impact of pandemic influenza”,195 vaccination is the key counter-measure, and 
since the production of vaccines usually takes between six and eight months,196 anti-virals 
are “the first pillar of medical prevention and intervention”.197 While competence ensures 
the EU has limited involvement in health system response, the Commission and ECDC 
coordinate and review non-pharmaceutical measures. For instance, at Phase 5 this involves 
guidance on how “to optimize use of scarce facilities (triage, modified clinical guidelines, 
modified hospital infection guidelines . . .etc.)”.198 
To focus on vaccines, preparedness uses a variety of  means, including support for 
research,199  a  public–private  partnership  between  public  authorities  and  the  vaccine 
industry to stimulate production, and an expedited market-authorisation procedure, all to 
deliver vaccine to the EU in the “shortest possible time”.200  Preparedness attempts to 
ensure equitable distribution of  scarce resources and reduce vulnerability. For example, 
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while again externalising the pandemic, the Commission helps to promote the 
“‘mutualisation’ of stocks to fight the disease at source” given “the lack of manufacturing 
capacity in many countries and the perceived imbalance between rich and powerful 
countries that collect strains through collaboration programmes with poor and affected 
ones  but  benefit  from  (their)  manufacturers’  production  only  themselves”.201   Also, 
threaded through the alert phases is the responsibility of the Commission, ECDC and MS 
authorities to target – and improvise as they review and retarget in light of the unfolding 
pandemic – limited stocks of anti-virals and vaccines to key health personnel and the most 
vulnerable defined in risk groups.202 
However, a key concern is the apparent focus of responsibility and skewing of attention 
and resources towards the protection of pharmaceuticals. This highlights the limitation of 
triage choices: pharmaceuticals are seemingly the means to deal with (and pre-selected by) the 
medical emergency model, but such that other, cheaper and perhaps more effective options 
are not so readily used. This is not necessarily to the advantage of risk groups since the 
normative direction of preparedness ensures pharmaceuticals are the focus of protection 
efforts – rather than those at risk. As such, preparedness reshapes the value and use of such 
classifications, essentially because they are aimed at mitigating adverse consequences to the 
economy and ensuring its optimisation, in part through resort to pharmaceuticals. In other 
words, it appears improvisation in triage choices is constrained, and the vulnerability of 
population increased, by the frame of medical emergency. 
Added to this, even as wider preventive measures such as hygiene are governed by 
preparedness, the focus is still on protecting them, in order to optimise the economy, rather 
than protecting population.203 More widely, since the focus is on triage in medical emergency, 
broader public health interventions in population as part of a more concerted and long-term 
response  are  further  undermined.  Overall,  the  focus  on  pharmaceuticals  implies  the 
boundaries of responsibility and blame are effectively limited to failures in their protection 
as the preferred triage choice within the medical emergency model. 
The prominence of pharmaceuticals has been explained by the close relations between 
the WHO and industry and the suggestion that the pandemic threat is talked up in order to 
generate orders.204 Some note that changes to the WHO’s alert phases were prompted by, 
and privilege, industrial ties.205 This is pertinent to the EU given how its alert phases are 
aligned to the WHO’s. Further, the clear bias of the EU’s pharmaceutical regime is towards 
getting (high-cost) products to market, regardless of their comparative efficacy, in order to 
support and optimise an innovative economy.206 This highlights the use and dissemination 
of market rationality in public health and open servicing of market needs as facilitated by 
preparedness and the wider exacerbating forces noted above. 
 
 
201 European Commission, “Pandemic Influenza Preparedness”, n. 105 above. 
202 Ibid. 
203 Staying at home and taking regular pain killers has been highlighted as the best option for most people infected 
with H1N1: Jenkins, “Swine flu?”, n. 149 above. For discussion of triage choices in relation to humanitarian 
responses to emergency, see T Murphy, “Public health sans frontières: human rights NGOs and ‘stewardship on 
a global scale’”, this special issue. 
204 D Cohen and P Carter, “WHO and the pandemic flu ‘conspiracies’” (2010) British Medical Journal 340. 
205 Such as when to declare a pandemic: ibid. 
206 The emphasis is on quality, safety and efficacy rather than “comparative therapeutic efficacy” and genuine 
need: Hervey and McHale, Health Law and the European Union,  n. 1 above, pp. 317–18. On the 
neoliberal orientation of EU pharmaceutical governance and biopolitics, see M Flear, “The EU’s biopolitical 
governance of  advanced therapy medicinal products” (2009) 16(1) Maastricht Journal of  European and 
Comparative Law 113. 
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Moving to social distancing, the ECDC must provide “scientific advice on non- 
pharmaceutical public health interventions”,207 and it works with the Commission and 
affected MSs, who must report on the effectiveness of their efforts through the EWRS in 
order to inform national and international planning. Social distancing becomes particularly 
important at Phase 6, when its use to regulate the internal market is highlighted. Indeed, the 
Commission must work with the MSs to: 
coordinate . . . the position on movement of  persons and goods and cooperate with 
appropriate  international  organizations  and  associations  and  transportation 
companies to implement standard measures for travellers on board international 
conveyances, consistent with the alert level.208 
Returning to the point introduced above, these are of special concern for risk groups 
who are produced as especially vulnerable and made subject to specific actions aimed at 
interrupting a pandemic, since it might make them vulnerable to repression. Medicine, law 
and governance work with metaphors of disease carriers to produce them as different from 
“normal” members of society.209 This production can work to provide the rationale for 
interventions, and they are highly susceptible to abuse. In other words, those deemed at risk 
of infection are also at risk of human rights infringements beyond the failure to ensure that 
they rather than pharmaceuticals are the focus of protection efforts. Wider exacerbating 
tendencies include the criminalisation of disease transmission, the wider securitisation of 
public health,210 and working with these, the figuration of disease carriers as active agents, 
aggressors and even “evil criminals” who must take responsibility for their condition and 
endangerment of  others.211  Particularly vulnerable groups include those coming from 
outside the EU, the zone where the threat is deemed to arise, and typically itinerant and 
already marginalised groups within the EU, such as the Roma or travelling communities.212 
Overall, as Murphy and Whitty stress, such interventions can “provoke or compound 
discrimination and stigmatisation of particular individuals and groups”.213 Yet, as they go 
on to explain, the efficacy of such social distancing might also be undermined given that 
individuals might avoid diagnosis and treatment where quarantine seems a realistic 
possibility.214 In addition, such techniques and practices directly infringe personal liberty 
and privacy rights, and could lead to healthy individuals being put at serious risk of infection 
should they be mistakenly quarantined. Yet, since only certain risk groups are targeted for 
specific interventions, there is an absence of burdens on all.215 This combined with the 
individualisation and responsibilisation attendant to risk mean such actions could be further 
depoliticised and left largely uncontested. 
 
207 European Commission, “Pandemic Influenza Preparedness”, n. 105 above, p. 20 (emphasis added). 
208 Ibid. p. 25. 
209 Sontag, Illness as Metaphor, n. 160 above, p. 171. 
210 S Elbe, “Pandemics on the radar screen: health security, infectious disease and the medicalisation of security” 
(2011)  59(4)  Political  Studies  848;  S  Elbe,  Security  and  Global  Health:  Toward  the  medicalization  of  insecurity 
(Cambridge: Polity Press 2010). 
211 J Montgomery, “Medicalizing crime – criminalizing health? The role of law” in C A Erin and S Ost (eds), The 
Criminal Justice System and Health Care (Oxford: OUP 2007). Cf. N Reis, “The 2003 SARS outbreak in Canada: 
legal and ethical lessons about the use of quarantine” in J Balint, S Philpott, R Baker and M Strosberg (eds), 
Ethics and Epidemics (Amsterdam: Elsevier Press 2006). 
212 S  i ek, “Liberal multiculturalism masks an old barbarism with a human face”, The Guardian, 3 October 2010. 
213 Murphy and Whitty, “Is human rights prepared?”, n. 19 above, at 235. 
214 Ibid. 
215 L Zedner, “Seeking security by eroding rights: the side-stepping of due process” in Goold and Lazarus (eds), 
Security and Human Rights, n. 153 above, p. 272, cited in Murphy and Whitty, n. 19 above, p. 235. Cf. M K Wynia, 
“Ethics and public health emergencies: restrictions on liberty” (2007) 7(2) American Journal of  Bioethics 1. 
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The wider linked forces traced above – greater security, the zero-sum relationship 
between human rights and risk (and safety and security), a focus on institutional risk and 
broader shifts towards reflexive governance, and the production of  legitimacy – might 
reinforce the tendency towards (investment in216 and) protection of pharmaceuticals and 
(admittedly currently to a lesser extent) social distancing. This is because, as indicated, in 
one way or another they seem to condition and reinforce a preference for the use of such 
interventions within a medical emergency model.217 
To focus on legitimacy, the preference for pharmaceuticals might also be explained by 
their cultural resonance and use for legitimation purposes. That is, pharmaceuticals are now 
central to well-being and health, and are dominant in marketing strategies that favour self- 
management and which are underpinned by the individualisation of  risk.218 This makes 
pharmaceuticals useful for governance as a way of relating to and managing public 
expectations, and especially for setting and limiting the boundaries of  responsibility and 
blame in the event of failure. The cultural resonance of pharmaceuticals helps to legitimate 
both the preference for them as a response to medical emergency and, through protection 
of their production and deployment, the preparedness regime. 
This use of  pharmaceuticals also undermines the political salience and use of  other 
triage choices and broader public health interventions in population as part of  a more 
concerted and long-term response. Put differently, it appears that a preference for 
pharmaceuticals (and constrained improvisation in triage choices) is politically useful as a 
way of relating to and managing public expectations in the face of what is constructed as a 
medical emergency in order to mitigate adverse consequences. However, this undermines 
resilience in that it also reinforces the distraction of  attention away from, and use of 
responses that could deal with, the social conditions producing pandemics. Another aspect 
of legitimation is apparent in the EU’s involvement in international pandemic planning to 
assist non-MSs as it seeks to govern its periphery and beyond. This helps to constitute the 
EU as an international actor, mark and secure its borders and identity, externalise the threat 
and limit the boundaries of its responsibility and accountability, and produce legitimacy by 
and through the demonstration of preparedness and response.219 
Adding to these concerns, preparedness contains only background references to the 
legal and ethical implications of interventions. In the Interim Document,220 the focus is more 
on ensuring minimal disruption to the internal market through assessment exercises and 
prior communication of counter-measures so as to ensure interoperability.221 For example, 
216 Furedi highlights a twist: a “culture of fear” is used by those in authority and in the welfare and security 
industries to promote investment in security. See F Furedi, Culture of  Fear Revisited 4th edn (London: 
Continuum 2006). 
217 Cf.  C  Caduff,  “Public  prophylaxis:  pandemic  influenza,  pharmaceutical  prevention  and  participatory 
governance” (2010) 5(2) BioSocieties 199. 
218 A Petryna and A Kleinman, “The pharmaceutical nexus” in A Petryna, A Lakoff and A Kleinman (eds), Global 
Pharmaceuticals: Ethics, markets, practices (Durham: Duke UP 2006). Also see: S R Whyte, S Van der Geest and A 
Hardon, Social Lives of  Medicines  (Cambridge: CUP 2003), especially “Drug vendors and their market: the 
commodification of health”. More generally, see G C Gray, “The responsibilisation strategy of health and safety: 
neo-liberalism and the reconfiguration of individual responsibility for risk” (2009) 49 British Journal of Criminology 
326. 
219 Furedi, Culture of  Fear, n. 216 above. 
220 For instance, “full respect for ethical standards, human rights, national and local laws and cultural sensitivities 
and  traditions”  in  interventions  is  noted  (European  Commission,  “Interim  Document”,  n.  108  above, 
Annex 8, p. 78). It is  supposedly a question of  checking that “[n]ational plans include a leading ethical 
framework for responses to public health crisis and national plans include a verification processes to assure 
that the ethical aspects of policy decisions to be used during the response to an outbreak balance individual 
and population rights” (ibid. p. 35). The identity of the “leading” framework remains unclear. 
221 As required for compliance with EU free movement law, see: Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU, n. 80 above. 
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“[e]thical issues are closely related to the legal issues . . . and are part of  the normative 
framework needed to assess the cultural acceptability of  measures like quarantine or selective 
immunisation of  pre-defined risk groups”.222 Of course, cultural acceptability is determined in 
part by the broader framing in governance and the forces sketched above. Even so, 
responsibility for the management of the ethical and legal implications of interventions – 
including blame in the event of failure – is located at MS level. 
Such a minimal concern for risk management highlights the EU’s eschewal of 
responsibility for the distortions and failures in relation to interventions produced by, at least 
in part, its discourse on preparedness. This move also enhances depoliticisation and 
naturalisation of preparedness and helps to shield the EU from adverse public perceptions 
in the event of controversy and failure. Again, these perceptions are managed and contained 
by the boundaries of responsibility and accountability. These boundaries are communicated 
as being limited to the protection of essential infrastructures and especially the 
pharmaceutical  response,  but  in  order  to  mitigate  consequences  of  a  pandemic  and 
optimise the economy. 
Further, the public rationality of the deficit model re-emerges, this time in making the 
ethical and legal implications of interventions matters of expert discourse and deliberation 
at MS level. This also reflects a broader observation that the complementary expert and 
public rationalities are used to authorise and legitimate certain preparedness response 
strategies, such as through use of pharmaceuticals, and reinforce existing power relations 
towards the objective of economic optimisation.223 
 
conclusion: towards  learning, enhanced  responsibility and resilience 
 
The analysis of preparedness highlights the operation of complementary expert and public 
rationalities in its constitutive discourses of risk, security, PUS, and which are undergirded 
by neoliberalism. While producing knowledge in an attempt to govern pandemics, the 
rationalities and discourses also delineate the boundaries of responsibility, and produce and 
mask governance distortions and failures. The rationalities also undermine participation 
because citizens are cast within a deficit model as being incapable of sharing in power to 
shape governance. In particular, citizens are limited through communication strategies to 
engage in hygiene efforts aimed at reducing contagion and pursuing their daily social and 
economic lives. Overall, the rationalities deny the normative within preparedness and 
essentially try to “mark off ” governance from popular control and contestation. 
In section 2, I nominated and made an initial sketch of supra-stewardship as a tool to 
resist the deficit model and facilitate citizen participation around framing, distribution and 
vulnerability in order to highlight the normative in the technical, especially the boundaries 
of  EU  responsibility,  and  the  production  of  governance  distortions  and  failures.  In 
section 3, I suggested some of the contours for engagement by supra-stewardship to show 
how citizens might use it to become active subjects as they open up knowledge domains, 
contribute towards decision-making and expand EU responsibility and accountability to 
include the definition of  the pandemic threat as a medical emergency and its attendant 
governance distortions and failures. 
222 European Commission, “Interim Document”, n. 108 above, p. 35 (and pp. 34–5  for legal 
implications). (emphasis added). For definitions, see Annex 3, pp. 64–6, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_threats/ Bioterrorisme/keydo_bio_01_en.pdf (last accessed 5 September 
2011). On EU support for ethics in national plans, see in the workshop “Ethical issues in  European 
national preparedness for pandemic influenza”, 
www.eu2008.fr/webdav/site/PFUE/shared/import/1120_pandemie_de_grippe/Pandemie_grippe_Pandem 
ic_influenza_Programme_FR_EN.pdf (last accessed 5 September 2011). 
223 Caduff, “Public prophylaxis”, n. 217 above
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Perhaps most important is using these insights to widen triage choices within the current frame of 
preparedness as being about dealing with a medical emergency and to guard against excessive and 
repressive measures. More difficult, given the limitations of  that frame, is using the insights to inflect 
preparedness with a wider set of public health concerns in order to look beyond mitigating consequences 
and bolster interventions in the social conditions producing pandemics – and ensuring that pandemic 
governance is not to the detriment of wider public health objectives. Yet, in re-emphasising uncertainty, 
and although it requires further honing, supra-stewardship could highlight the need for a substantive input 
from those who are most affected by decision-making that cannot be based on the dominant hubristic 
technologies of risk and science alone. 
Citizen participation and institutional learning could be fostered further by exploiting the rhetorical 
openings provided by the discourses constituting preparedness. For example, while used to construct 
the deficit model, PUS, especially as inflected through communication, could also be used to stimulate 
citizens’ awareness, attitudes and preferences. Claims for violations of  human rights and ethical 
obligations, especially in relation to broader public health objectives or societal risk, and built around 
framing, distribution and vulnerability, could exploit reflexive governance and the sensitisation of 
governance to the institutional risk of human rights linked to bioethics. This includes the potential for a 
human rights consciousness understood as being about empowerment to use bioethics in order to 
disrupt the interests and standing of the EU.224 
A particularly useful platform could be the European Citizens’ Initiative, “the first transnational 
instrument of participatory democracy in world history”.225 Further reinforcement could come from 
moves towards organisational accountability and exploitation of  the EU’s legitimacy needs. Overall, 
the citizen input provided by supra- stewardship could contribute towards better outputs and 
understanding of  the limits of governance to organise uncertainty, helping to make preparedness and 
wider public health governance more secure and resilient in the event of failure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
224 Cf. “legal risk+” proposed by Murphy and Whitty, “Is human rights prepared?”, n. 19 above, p. 233. 
225 See www.citizens-initiative.eu/?page_id=2 (last accessed 5 September 2011). Established by Article 11(4) TEU and Article 24(1) 
TFEU. The practical arrangements and procedures are provided by Regulation 211/2011. Article 11(4) TEU provides “[n]ot less 
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